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ABSTRACT 
  
In August 1997, the FDA allowed brand specific advertising on TV. A simultaneous rise 
in Direct to Consumer Advertising (DTCA) spending and prescription drug sales has resulted in a 
heated debate among pharmaceutical firms, medical practitioners, in the US Congress, and the 
popular press. One side claims that DTCA creates demand for the advertised brand; the other 
claims that DTCA increases consumer knowledge. The current study sheds light on the debate 
with a comparison of consumer welfare before and after the 1997 policy change, using a structural 
econometric model. The results suggest that DTCA seems to be increasing consumer welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
The pharmaceutical industry is a heavily advertised industry, with spending in 2012 of roughly 27 billion 
Dollars (Pew Health, 2013). Pharmaceutical firms use a number of promotional tools, such as visits by 
sales persons to physicians’ offices (commonly known as detailing), product sampling, journal 
advertising, and direct to consumer advertising (DTCA).  
There has long been a debate about both the effectiveness and consequences of these promotional 
tools. Whereas proponents argue that they help physicians learn about the drug and keep up with medical 
information (Frosch et al., 2010), detractors argue that physicians do not find most of these tools useful 
(Reast et al., 2008). These latter also suggest that such promotions increase the costs of drugs, in turn 
preventing a wider population from enjoying the benefits of new drugs. As a result, various governmental 
agencies have started closely monitoring how much pharmaceutical firms spend on these tools (for 
example, the United States government, concerned that marketing practices by pharmaceutical firms are 
behind increases in drug prices, has issued a warning to limit some of these practices (US Governmental 
Accountability Office, 2006)). DTCA, in particular, is the object of much heated debate and considerable 
scrutiny. The key reason for this is probably that DTCA is the only marketing tool that aims to reach and 
influence patients directly, unlike the others that have traditionally been aimed at physicians.  
With DTCA, pharmaceutical firms are now able to exert a pull strategy on end consumers, in effect 
making patients consult their doctors about the advertised prescription drugs (Gonul et al., 2000). In effect, 
successful DTCA changes the nature of the relationship between the players in the market for 
pharmaceuticals (drug companies, physicians, and patients). Much of the controversy around DTCA is 
centered on the type of patients that DTCA entices. A few studies (for example, Holmer, 1999; Roth, 
2003) suggest that DTCA provides valuable information to consumers that they may not otherwise have 
received, or have received too late. This motivates undiagnosed patients to seek additional information 
from sources such as physicians and pharmacists (Calfee, 2002; The National Consumers League, 2003).  
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On the other hand, one study suggests that DTCA influences current patients who have been 
already diagnosed and are currently being treated, and does not motivate the undiagnosed to meet with 
their physicians and to seek out medication for the disease (Frosch et al., 2010). Further, Reast et al., 2008 
also argue that DTCA overstates benefits and does not adequately represent the risks associated with the 
drugs. Medical professionals on this side of the debate say DTCA leads to the creation of demand for 
specific brand names and possibly generates pressure on physicians to write prescriptions for expensive 
brands (Hollon, 1999; Mehta and Purvis, 2003), or worse leads patients to self-diagnose themselves into 
a therapeutic condition. Politicians like Representative Jerrold Nadler (New York) sums up the public’s 
concern by saying that “You should not be diagnosed by some pitchman on TV who doesn’t know you 
whatsoever” (New York Times 2009).  
 If there is one common theme in the debate around DTCA, it is that various stakeholders 
differ in their assessment of whether consumers are better or worse off because of DTCA. Somewhat 
surprisingly, there exists no rigorous empirical examination of this issue. The current study attempts to 
fill this gap by examining the impact of DTCA in a leading therapeutic category. A change in policy by 
the FDA provides a natural experiment that lets us isolate the impact of DTCA. Briefly, prior to 1997 a 
“brief summary” of side effects and contraindications etc. was required to be part of any DTCA. The 
“brief summary” entailed a lot of information and was therefore prohibitively costly for anything but print 
advertising. In 1997 this requirement was relaxed to replace “brief summary” with “adequate provision”, 
making it possible to have DTCA on TV.    
Following prior literature (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003; Petrin 2002; Trajtenberg 1989), a standard 
measure of consumer welfare is used to examine whether consumers are better or worse off as a result of 
DTCA. We use the notion of compensating variation, that captures the dollar amount by which a consumer 
needs to be compensated to maintain the same utility level after a policy change as she had before the 
policy change (Hicks 1942). Consumer choice is used to infer utility gained from the good, and the 
measure is based on the assumption that the utility a consumer derives from a “good” before and after is 
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based on certain underlying preferences that do not change due to the policy. Note that a weakness of this 
approach is that the welfare change so measured cannot account for changes in life styles or consumer 
preferences.  
Using a dataset for HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (“Statins”), our data consist of information on 
sales, detailing and DTCA in the US Statin market. Statins are the standard drug class for the treatment of 
hyperlipidemia. This particular therapeutic category was chosen because it had the third highest overall 
category sales ($29B worldwide sales in 2012) and is one of the more heavily advertised therapeutic 
categories.   
The empirical strategy was to construct a structural econometric discrete choice model of demand 
pre- and post- policy change (Chintagunta, Bonfrer and Song 2002).  An attractive feature of the discrete 
choice model is its ability to compute consumer welfare explicitly (Chintagunta, Dube and Singh 2003). 
Therefore, a mixed-logit aggregate demand model that allows for a flexible substitution pattern between 
the various drugs in the therapeutic category was developed, while accounting for the and endogeneity of 
prices of drugs (Berry, Levinson and Pakes (henceforth BLP) 1995); Villas-Boas and Winer, 1999). Based 
on parameters of the structural econometric demand system, computation of the change in consumers’ 
welfare due to the introduction of DTCA was carried out (Chintagunta, Dube and Singh 2003).  
 The results of the research study indicate that consumer welfare increases as a result of the FDA’s 
relaxation of the DTCA rule. The study also finds that DTCA has a significant impact on both overall 
category sales and individual drug choice. However, detailing has a larger impact on overall category sales 
in the earlier part of the category life cycle, and also plays a larger role than DTCA on individual drug 
choice. The results offer implications for lawmakers, policy officials and managers of pharmaceutical 
firms.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the relevant literature is 
reviewed. In §3, the data are discussed and various institutional details related to the Statin market are 
provided. §4, provides the model formulation and estimation procedure. In §5, the results are discussed 
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and §6 concludes. 
 
2. Context and Relevant Literature 
Context. Prior to 1997, as per the Kefauver Harris Amendment of 1962, FDA permitted DTCA by 
pharmaceutical firms if the firms offered a “brief summary (FDA 1)” of side effects, contraindications 
and effectiveness (Iizuka, 2004). The US department of Health and Human Services acknowledged that, 
“providing this (brief summary) amount of information in television and radio advertising was difficult, 
because of time and space constraints” (HHS News, US Department of Health, 1997). As a result, the 
requirement enabled firms to pursue DTCA efforts mainly through print media as providing the brief 
summary in television advertising was prohibitively costly.  
In 1997, FDA relaxed this requirement and allowed drug specific DTCA in which firms could mention 
the drug’s name and the condition for which it was to be used. More importantly, the advertisements were 
now required to carry an "adequate provision" statement instead of providing a “brief summary” 
statement. Broadcast advertisements could meet the "adequate provision" requirement by giving a number 
of sources for finding a drug's prescribing information. Such sources could include a healthcare provider 
(for example, a doctor), a toll-free telephone number, the current issue of a magazine that contains a print 
advertisement or a web site address (for more details on the timeline of the regulation, see Iizuka, 2004) 
After this policy change, DTCA as a percentage of total pharmaceutical promotion grew from 8.6% in 
1996 to 16% in 2000. DTC advertising increased 28% annually between 1996 and 2001 (Kaiser report, 
2003). During the same time interval total prescription drugs sales almost doubled to $208 billion (NDC 
Health, 2003). An NIHCM (2001) study found that the 50 most heavily advertised drugs accounted for 
48% of the rise in sales of all prescription drugs in 1999-2000.  
 
Related Literature. While the majority of the early literature in the area of pharmaceutical sales promotion 
has focused on the effect of detailing (not surprisingly, given the emphasis on understanding physicians’ 
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prescription behavior), there is now a nascent literature examining the demand-side effects of DTCA.  
Recent work based on surveys has established that DTCA motivates patients to visit their 
physicians and to talk about their condition and symptoms (Wilkes et al., 2002). Rosenthal (2003) uses 
aggregate data of sales from six therapeutic classes and demonstrates that DTCA has a positive and 
significant effect on overall demand, but does not affect the market share within the particular class. Iizuka 
and Jiin (2005) also use data from pre- and post- the FDA regulation change and find that increased DTCA 
is associated with increased doctor visits. Donohue and Berndt (2004) and Narayanan, Desiraju and 
Chintagunta (2004) compare the effectiveness of detailing meetings and DTCA on drug choice. Both 
studies find that detailing has a greater effect than DTCA on drug choice. The latter study also finds 
evidence of complementary effects of detailing and DTCA efforts on drug choice. It is worth noting that 
the effects of DTCA on category sales vis-à-vis individual drug market share are mixed. Iizuka and Jin 
(2005) find that DTCA by a drug helps category expansion and not necessarily the market share of the 
drug, while Narayanan, Desiraju and Chintagunta (2004) find that DTCA has a positive impact on both 
category sales and individual market share. 
 Another set of studies is concerned with the effects of DTCA on patients’ compliance. For 
example, Bowman, Heilman, and Seetharaman (2004) report that advertising has a varied response on 
patients’ compliance. Wosinska (2005) finds similar results and suggests spillover effects of DTCA, in 
that compliance with a brand may increase when other competing brands advertise more heavily. This is 
consistent with the DTCA proponents’ claim that advertising by any brand of drug motivates consumers 
to visit their physicians to talk about their condition and also helps in reminding them about the benefits 
of the drug, thereby affecting their compliance.  Although the extant studies help understand the various 
demand effects of DTCA, no study has quantified the effects of DTCA on consumer welfare.  
Consumer Welfare. The concept of consumer welfare has long been an established way to measure how 
well off a consumer is. Various studies have explicitly empirically tested this across multiple industries. 
For example, Trajtenberg (1989) computes the welfare change due to use of computer tomography, and 
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Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) compute the change in consumer welfare due to increased product variety in 
online book stores. The change in consumer welfare is one of the key considerations of the US Federal 
Trade Commison (FTC) when it evaluates mergers (Werder and Froeb, 1994). Studies on linking changes 
in consumer welfare to discrete policy shifts have also been undertaken. Lusk et al. (2010) study the effect 
of food labels and bans (on cloning in beef production and methyl mercury in fish) on consumer welfare. 
Dubois et al. (2014) quantify the welfare impacts of banning advertising in the potato chip market. We 
should point out that in this research we do not claim to test whether DTCA is informative or not (e.g., 
Morgan et al. 2003).Further, this research does not test if life style choices or other non-drug interventions 
would benefit a consumer (we would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for our drawing attention to 
this distinction). 
 A standard measure for welfare in such contexts is the Hicksian, or compensating variation (Hicks 
1942; Chintagunta, Dube and Singh 2003). The idea is to capture the amount of change, in monetary terms 
that is  necessary to compensate the consumer for the change in price after the policy change, to keep them 
at the same level of utility (in our case, the introduction of DTCA is the policy change). Formally,  if there 
are two budgets a consumer faces, with initial price and income (p1, m1) and post- policy change price 
and income (p2, m2) then a measure of welfare change is the difference in indirect utility, v1(p1,m1)-
v2(p1,m1). If this utility difference is positive, then the policy change is worth doing, from a consumer’s 
point of view (Petrin 2001). The method requires specification of the parametric form of demand followed 
by estimation of the parameters of the utility function (please see section 4 and the technical appendix for 
more details). We would like to emphasize that the Hicksian measure of consumer welfare is driven by 
the share/choice of a good and does not capture the role of other life style changes on consumer welfare.  
3.  Data  
The proposed model is ideally tested on drugs that have substantial sales, market aggressively, and have 
existed both before and after the policy change. The choice of drugs used in this study is based on these 
criteria. The data set spans a period from January 1992 to December 2001, and consists of four branded 
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cholesterol reducing drugs (Statins) in the U.S.A., that were all launched before the policy change in 
1997. These were the only four products in the market during that time. In 2011 almost 20 million 
Americans were taking some form of Statin (Reuters, 2012), which are considered the first line of 
treatment for most patients with high cholesterol. The total Statin market in 2009 was $27 billion.  
The four drugs in our data set are Mevacor (Lovastatin, 1987), Pravachol (Pravastatin, 1991), 
Zocor (Simvasatatin, 1991) and Lipitor (Atorvastatin, 1996), in order of first approval to market (brand 
name followed by the chemical name and the year of approval). Lipitor, with sales of $6.1 billion (IMS, 
2003) was the largest selling drug (across all drugs, not just Statins) and was destined to become the 
world’s first $10 billion drug (Business Week online, 2002). Zocor, at $4.2 billion sales was the second 
largest selling drug, and Pravachol had achieved the $1 billion mark in 2002. Lipitor’s sales grew by 39% 
in 1999-2000, Zocor’s by 22.2% and Pravachol’s by 16%. Indeed, by 2012 Lipitor was the world’s largest 
selling drug, at $12.5B, indicating the importance of this category. 
These drugs not only have large sales but also spend heavily on DTCA. In 2000, Zocor with a 
DTCA expenditure of $91.2 million was the fifth largest DTCA spender, followed by Pravachol in 12th 
place with $62 million and Lipitor in 15th place with $58.2 million (Kaiser, 2002). Each brand had positive 
sales and undertook detailing before 1997. After the change in FDA policy Pravachol, Zocor and Lipitor 
started DTCA, from January 1998, while continuing with detailing. Mevacor did not use DTCA and 
reduced its detailing over time (Mevacor was due to lose its patent protection in December 2001 and may 
have reduced its detailing because of this). It is very important to note that during the study time period, 
all the four brands were on patent, and faced no competition from generics (henceforth, we use the terms 
brand and drug interchangeably). 
The data were sourced from IMS Health USA, a leading company in healthcare. IMS Health USA 
uses its National Prescription Audit (NPA) to gather these data. NPA measures demand for prescription 
drugs, in the retail setting and hospitals and captures what is ultimately dispensed to consumers. From the 
universe of retail, standard mail service, specialty mail service and long-term care pharmacies, IMS selects 
 8 
a representative sample stratified by geographic location. The pharmacy universe is comprised of more 
than three billion prescriptions from retail, mail service, and long-term care pharmacies. From this IMS 
collects data on new and refilled prescriptions for every day of the month. IMS’s The National Sales 
Perspectives™ (NSP) measures sales at actual transaction prices (IMS Health via CDSE). IMS health also 
measures total promotional spend (detailing and DTCA) using its Integrated Promotional Services™ (IPS) 
from office-based and hospital-based physicians(IMS Health via CDSE). 
The data variables used in this paper are i) monthly sales to retailers and monthly sales to hospitals 
in USD for the four brands (at the dosage level, e.g., Mevacor 20 mg, packet of 90 tablets); ii) monthly 
unit sales to retailers, and monthly unit sales to hospitals; iii) monthly detailing expenditure;  iv) monthly 
DTCA expenditure in USD.  
 
  
3.1   Operationalization of Variables 
Sales and Price. Monthly data on volume sales (units) at the dosage packet level were used. One issue 
here is that the equivalent dosages of different products may differ, e.g., a 20 mg daily dosage of Mevacor 
is equivalent to a 10 mg daily dosage of Lipitor. To account for this, the daily equivalent dosage, available 
from the Physicians Desk Reference, was used to calculate sales of equivalent doses and price per dose of 
each of these products.  
The therapy length for cardiovascular drugs is a month. Since the data are monthly, the volume 
sales at the brand level in units of daily equivalent dosage were summed to a monthly level. Calculation 
of price per unit dosage was done using the daily equivalent dosage from which average price per dose at 
the brand level was calculated. Prices were deflated to 1984 prices using the Consumer Price Index.  
Category level prices were obtained by weighting the brand prices by their shares. 
Detailing and DTCA. As mentioned earlier, pharmaceutical firms also undertake direct marketing to 
physicians. The principal form of this is detailing, wherein a sales representative goes to the physician’s 
office and talks to him/her, aided by graphs, charts, videos etc., often citing results from scientific research 
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(Parsons and Vanden Abeele, 1981). Pharmaceutical firms spent $4.7B in 2001 on detailing in the U.S. 
(IMS health), making it the single largest expenditure by pharmaceutical firms (Wittink 2002). We have 
data on detailing and DTCA at the monthly level. All the four brands in the dataset had undertaken 
detailing for the span of data. Although FDA’s guidelines were issued in August 1997, the Statin brands 
studied here did not start DTCA until January 1998. Data on DTC advertisements span from January 1998 
through December 2001. Mevacor had no DTCA spending at any time.  
Market Share.  The estimation of our econometric models involves a specification of  the market share of 
each drug. In order to account for customers not currently using Statins (and thus allowing for possibility 
of category expansion) it is imperative to get an estimate of the total market for such drugs is required. 
Data from the National Institute of Health’s (NIH) National Cholesterol Education Program (NCEP) 
suggest that about 12.7 million people in the US required lipid lowering drugs at the time (Sempos et. al., 
1993). This number was the total possible number of patients, and when combined with the equivalent 
dosage and therapy length allowed calculation of the total market. Note, that this total market includes all 
those that are on Statins, those on other cholesterol reducing drugs, and those that do not take any 
cholesterol reducing drugs. Each brand’s market share in each month was calculated based on this total 
market. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are given in Table 1. The table shows the mean dosage 
units, price, detailing and DTCA expenditures for the four drugs pre- and post-DTCA. Figures 1 to 4 
presents how the mean dosage units, price, detailing expenditures and DTCA expenditures vary over time 
for the four drugs under analysis. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Drug 
Mean Sales 
($M) 
Mean Price 
($) 
Mean Detailing 
($M) 
Mean DTCA 
 10 
（$M） 
 
1992-
1997 
1998-
2001 
1992- 
1997 
1998-
2001 
1992- 
1997 
1998-
2001 
1992- 
1997 
1998- 
2001 
Lipitor 27.07 188.30 108.30 91.16 4.83 5.97      -- 3.62 
Zocor 44.40 186.65 99.31 88.67 2.34 3.93 
     -- 
5.27 
Pravachol 19.94 57.07 116.63 125.92 2.53 3.16      -- 3.52 
Mevacor 70.02 16.68 76.31 81.64 1.58 0.07       -- 0.00 
 
Figure 1: Volume Sales 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Price 
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Figure 3: Detailing 
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Figure 4: DTC Advertising
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4. Model Formulation 
Similar to any form of advertising, DTCA can have two different effects: a) it can expand the category, b) 
it can change the market share of individual drugs within the category. Two sets of models are required to 
capture these separate effects: a category level model to capture category growth and a brand level discrete 
choice model to understand individual drug choice (Narayanan et al. 2004).  
One complication is the need to account for the possible carryover effects of detailing and DTCA 
over time. Following prior literature, accounting for such effects is done through a Nerlove-Arrow 
exponential decay goodwill model (Nerlove and Arrow, 1962; Narayanan et al., 2004). Previous studies 
also show that promotional efforts such as detailing and advertising have diminishing returns due to wear-
out (Manchanda et al., 2000; Malaviya et al., 1999). Wear-out is incorporated in the model by using a 
square root term. The relevant equations indicating carryover and wear-out can be found in the technical 
appendix (T1 and T2). 
 
4.1  Category Level Model 
Sales of a product category are a function of category level prices and category level marketing variables. 
Thus, category sales at time t ( tCategorySales ) are a function of category prices                                       (
tCategoryPrice ), category detailing stock( tCatDetailStock ),  category DTCA advertising stock              (
tCategoryDTCStock ), and time trend variables that account for category growth over a period of time. 
These include the linear and quadratic time trend variables (time and time squared respectively).  The 
equations for the category expansion model for the two regimes (Pre-1997 no DTCA; post- 1997 with 
DTCA) are given by: 
[Pre-1997: No DTCA] 
0 1 2
2
3 4
ln(CategorySales ) CategoryPrice CategoryDetailingStock
Time  Time
t t t
t
  
  
  
  
 
 
(1) 
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[Post-1997: With DTCA] 
' ' '
0 1 2
' ' ' 2 '
3 4 5
ln(CategorySales ) CategoryPrice CategoryDetailingStock
CategoryDTCAStock Time  Time
t t t
t t
  
   
  
   
 
 
(2) 
In the above equations, the category sales, CategorySalest is the sum of sales for all (four) brands at time 
t, and is given by: 
4
1
CategorySales Salest jt
j
  (3) 
where Salesjt is the sales of brand j at time t. For CategoryPricet, CategoryDetailingStockt and 
CategoryDTCAStockt  the weighted mean of prices, the sum of brand specific detailing stock, and the sum 
of brand specific DTCA stock are used (the weights are the shares of the individual brands). Time 
represents the time in months since Mevacor was introduced. This was the first brand to be introduced 
and this operationalization is meant to capture both the linear and nonlinear effects of time on category 
diffusion since the introduction of the first drug in the category.  
4.2 Brand Level Model 
The brand level demand model captures a physicians’ discrete choice of a particular drug, conditional on 
choosing to prescribe from the category. In other words, an “outside alternative” is explicitly modeled, 
which could mean prescribing some other drug or no drugs at all. Taking a random-utility approach, the 
utility ijtU  derived by individual i, for brand j at time t as follows is: ijtijtijt VU  where ijtV and ijt  
are 
the deterministic and random components of utility respectively. ijtV can be expressed as follows for the 
two regimes: 
[Pre-1997: No DTCA] 
0 1 2ijt ij i jt i jt jt ijtU price DetailingStock          
(4) 
 
[Post-1997: With DTCA] 
0 1 2 3DetailingStock DTCAStockijt ij i jt i jt i jt jt ijtU price            
(5) 
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where, DetailingStock jt , jtDTCAStock and price jt capture the detailing stock, DTCA stock and 
price of the drug j at time t, respectively. In the above two equations, i1  represents the price-sensitivity, 
i2  and 3i capture the response to detailing stock and DTCA stock respectively, and ij0  represents the 
preference for the particular brand j (i.e., “brand constants”). ijt represents the usual error term. Many 
product characteristics are unobserved by the econometrician but known to the manufacturer. Such 
unobserved characteristics may be correlated with price and not accounting for these correlations could 
lead to biased estimates of the price parameter (BLP 1995). Accounting for such effects in this formulation 
is done by using the unobserved jt  term. 
For the sake of brevity, we use the same notation for the parameters across the two regimes. All 
the parameters are allowed to change pre and post policy change. Following prior literature, in the brand 
choice model formulation an assumption is made that the decision making entity is the physician-patient 
pair, and the choice is made by this pair (see e.g., Narayanan et. al, 2005). While admittedly a 
simplification, note that while DTCA is targeted towards patients, prescriptions are written by physicians 
with inputs from the patients. It is during such discussions that the effect of DTCA on brand choice would 
manifest itself.  
The decision maker can choose a product from among the brands under consideration, or choose 
the outside option. Let the utility from the outside option be given by  
tiitiU 000   
(6) 
Normalizing ti0 to 0 identifies the mean preferences of other brands. The standard assumption that ijt
and ti0 are i.i.d. and from an extreme value distribution is made. 
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4.3 Measuring Change in Consumer Welfare 
A structural demand model is ideally suited for calculating changes in consumer welfare because it 
allows for the computation of consumer welfare explicitly (Chintagunta et al., 2003). The focus of this 
study is on computing the change in consumer welfare due to DTCA. The welfare change is calculated 
using Equation (7) (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; details are provided in the technical appendix). This 
measure of consumer welfare is based on changes in demand side utility parameters.  
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5. Estimation 
The data is split into two subsets. The first subset covers 1992-1997 and corresponds to equations (3) and 
(6) for category level and brand level estimation respectively. In this regime the four brands, Mevacor, 
Zocor, Pravachol, and Lipitor competed on price and detailing. The next subset comprises of the same 
four brands Mevacor, Zocor, Pravachol and Lipitor, competing on price, detailing, and DTCA between 
1998 and 2001, and corresponds to equation (2) and (5) for category level and brand level estimations.  
Demand parameters are estimated for each of these subsets of data for both the category level and 
within category brand level models. The utility equations account for consumer heterogeneity in 
sensitivity to price, detailing and DTCA. A logit demand model that does not account for unobserved 
heterogeneity suffers from the IIA property, wherein cross-elasticities of demand are always in the ratio 
of the shares of the brands (Nevo, 2001). To handle this problem and to facilitate a reasonable substitution 
pattern across the brands, a random coefficient logit model is estimated, with price, detailing and DTCA 
parameters assumed to be normally distributed across the population. Product characteristics unobserved 
by the econometrician may be correlated with price, giving rise to the problem of endogeneity. This is 
accounted for using three sets of instruments(please see the technical appendix).  
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As is now standard in the literature, an estimation approach which essentially tries to match the 
predicted and observed market shares is used. Specifically, a contraction mapping technique (BLP, 1995) 
is employed, from which a GMM objective function is minimized to recover the parameters (Nevo, 2001).  
The carryover parameters Det and Dtc are estimated using a simpler model, because these cannot 
be estimated within the larger model and need to be fixed (Narayanan et al. 2004). The carryover 
parameter values thus estimated are 0.85 and 0.72 for detailing and DTCA respectively. Further details on 
the estimation are provided in the technical appendix. 
 
6.  Results 
The category demand model parameters estimates are reported in Table 2 and the brand choice model 
parameter estimates in Table 3. For ease of discussion, the results have been tabulated such that the results 
for the pre- and post- DTCA are together in each table.  
The category level estimates in Table 2 indicate that DTCA has a positive and significant effect 
on total category sales. The price parameters are negative and significant in both the pre- and post- DTCA 
regimes. The detailing response parameters are positive and significant in both the pre- and post- DTCA 
regimes. The response to detailing decreased post-DTCA; however, the difference in the detailing 
responses from pre- and post- DTCA regimes is not statistically significant. The category constant is 
higher in the post- DTCA regime indicating category expansion post policy change. The main takeaway 
from the model is that DTCA has a significant positive effect on category growth. This result is in 
conformity with some of the earlier studies that suggest DTCA helps new patients to seek treatment for 
their therapeutic condition.  Interestingly, detailing which was highly significant in the early years of the 
category seems to play a somewhat lesser role in the latter period, possibility due to Statins being a mature 
category by 1998.  
 
Table 2: Category Level Parameters 
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Pre-DTCA 
(1992-1997) 
Post-DTCA 
(1998-2001) 
 Parameter 
Standard 
Errors 
Parameter 
Standard 
Errors 
Constant 20.21 *** 0.99 23.57 *** 2.36 
Price -0.02 ** 0.01 -0.05 *** 0.02 
Detailing 1.711E-05 *** 5.02E-06 1.48E-05 4.07E-05 
DTCA   2.22E-05 ** 1.05E-05 
Time 0.00 ns 0.09 ns 
Time sq. 0.00 ns -0.00 ns 
     *** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%,  
 
The brand choice model estimates in Table 3 show that in the pre-DTCA regime the price 
parameter is both in the right direction and significant. The detailing parameter is positive and significant. 
The brand constants are generally in the proportion of the market shares of the competing brands during 
the pre-DTCA regime. For example, Mevacor with the largest average share has the highest brand constant 
while Pravachol with the lowest average share has the smallest brand constant.  
 In the post-DTCA regime, results show that price, detailing, and DTCA are all significant and in 
the right direction. In other words, detailing and DTCA affect not only category growth, but also aid in 
brand switching. Note that although the effect of detailing is greater than that of DTCA, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two. The brand constants are generally proportional to the 
market shares of the brands. Note that the intercepts for all the four brands are negative in both the pre 
and post DTCA regime because the intrinsic preferences for the bands are normalized with respect to the 
outside good. There seems to be no significant unobserved heterogeneity  on the four brands, price, 
detailing and DTCA. 
 In comparing the estimates across the two regimes, the first finding is that consumers’ price 
sensitivity decreases post-DTCA. Implications of this are discussed in the next section. The effect of 
detailing also decreased post-DTCA. The intrinsic preferences for the four brands post-DTCA are 
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significantly higher as compared to the preferences from the pre-DTCA regime. This is in line with the 
earlier finding that DTCA helps in category growth. 
 
Table 3: Brand Level Parameters 
 
Pre-DTCA 
(1992-1997) 
Post-DTCA 
(1998-2001) 
 Parameter 
Standard 
Errors 
Parameter 
Standard 
Errors 
Lipitor Intercept -8.79 *** 0.78 -4.09 ** 1.83 
Zocor Intercept -9.47 *** 3.13 -3.86 ** 1.71 
Pravachol Intercept -10.34 *** 3.52 -3.97 * 2.20 
Mevacor Intercept -8.76 *** 2.65 -4.87 *** 1.06 
Price -0.04 ** 0.02 -0.02 ** 0.01 
Detailing 5.29E-04 * 2.81E-04 1.12E-04 * 6.00E-05 
DTCA   4.78E-05 ** 2.34E-05 
*** Significant at 99%, ** Significant at 95%, * Significant at 90%,  
Note: Heterogeneity parameters were not found to be significant. 
 
 
The focal variable, change in consumer welfare, was calculated by inserting the demand side 
parameters from the pre- and post- DTCA regime into equation (7). This captures the dollar amount that 
consumers would need to be compensated to keep their level of utility the same as before the change 
(McFadden 1999). In this context, consumer welfare increases in the post- DTCA regime by $9,408.14. 
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7.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The change in policy of allowing DTCA by pharmaceutical firms for prescription drugs has generated a 
lot of debate. The debate has focused mainly on whether DTCA increases the footfall of potential 
patients into doctors’ offices leading to earlier diagnosis and better treatment of patients, or whether it 
simply makes patients desire a specific brand.  
This study focuses on empirically testing for changes in consumers’ welfare after DTCA was 
allowed. The findings suggest that in the case of Statins consumer welfare increased by $9408.18 after 
DTCA was allowed. The results also suggest that DTCA let to category expansion as well as enhanced 
sales of each brand. 
 Of course, given each medical condition is different, DTCA in another category of drugs may or 
may not have a similar category expansion or consumer welfare enhancing effect. This study, being the 
first to empirically test the change in welfare after the policy change, can help in the analysis of future 
policy changes on DTCA.  
 The world of pharmaceutical marketing itself is changing. Traditionally blockbuster drugs, those 
with sales of $1 billion, were driven by vast sales forces, and a share of voice driven commercial model 
(Rickwood, 2012). This seems to suggest that detailing and DTCA played a large role in the success of 
these blockbuster drugs. Today though, the definition of a blockbuster drug is changing. The previously 
mentioned billion-plus sellers were used predominantly in primary care settings and were targeted at 
chronic conditions. The new blockbuster model is focused more on specialty therapy. For example, in 
2002, 70% of all traditionally defined blockbuster drugs were primary care products versus 44% in 
2011(Rickwood, 2012). Interestingly, markets for biologic and injectables, which have much smaller 
patient populations than small molecule drugs (traditional), are growing. These biologic and injectables 
are considered the products of the future and their share of market spending on promotions has been 
growing (Kornfiel et al, 2013). Further, DTCA via internet and electronic promotions, although small at 
the moment, is increasing (Stanton, 2011; Kornfiel et al., 2013). Given the findings of this study, it 
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would be interesting to examine the consumer welfare impact of a very targeted DTCA to these small 
populations. More generally, as advertising spending on paid digital media by the US healthcare and 
pharmaceutical industry keeps increasing (from $1.18 billion in 2013 expected to be $1.47 billion by 
2017 (eMarketer, 2013) it may be worthwhile for practitioners to understand in what category of drugs 
such advertising enhances consumer welfare and where it does not. Marketing has been criticized for its 
focus on enhancing corporate rather than consumer welfare (Peltier et al., 2002). Hopefully more 
analysis of the kind this study has undertaken can help redress this imbalance of focus. 
Being among the first, this study suffers from many limitations. First, it does not account for the 
welfare effects of life style changes and other non-drug interventions for a patient. Second, while it 
speaks to the change in consumers’ welfare, it cannot shed any light on the change in producers’ 
welfare. A future study empirically testing both components of social welfare would improve the 
understanding of policy decisions. 
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Technical Appendix 
We first write the equations used to estimate Detailing and DTCA stock. Then we write out the 
specification for the estimation of the demand parameters followed by equations used to calculate the 
change in consumer welfare. 
T1: Specification of carryover and Wear-Out 
Using a Nerlove-Arrow exponential decay goodwill model to capture carryover and a square root term 
to capture wear-out in marketing:  
Brand j’s goodwill stock of detailing at time period t, jtDetStock , is given by: 
Det 1DetailingStock  DetailingStock Detailingjt jt jt                                (T1)                                                             
 
Where Detailing jt is brand j’s level of detailing at time at period t and Det is the carryover coefficient of 
detailing. Similarly brand j’s goodwill stock of DTCA in period t, jtDTCAStock , is given by: 
jtjtjt DTCADTCAStock DTCAStock 1Dtca                                                        
(T2) 
 
Where jtDTCA  is, brand j’s level of advertising at time t, an Dtca is the carryover coefficient associated 
with DTCA. 
Since we will refer to two particular equations from the body of paper in the next two sections, we 
rewrite them here for ease of exposition, retaining the numbering from the paper. 
[Pre-1997: No DTCA] 
0 1 2ijt ij i jt i jt jt ijtU price DetailingStock          
(4) 
[Post-1997: With DTCA] 
0 1 2 3ijt ij i jt i jt i jt jt ijtU price DetailingStock DTCAStock            
(5) 
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T2: Estimation 
We elaborate on the estimation technique for the two equations (4) and (5). The Berry, Levinson and 
Pakes ((henceforth BLP) 1995) estimation technique suggests that when accounting for both heterogeneity 
and endogeneity, the utility function be split into two parts, a mean utility term and an individual specific 
term. Following this technique, the parameters i1 , i2 , and i3  are now written as  
iii 111    
iii 222    
iii 222                                                                                                               
(T3) 
 
  
Thus utility for brand j, at time t, for individual i is now given by: 
ijtjtijtU    (T4) 
where jt  is the mean utility level of product j and is given by  
0 1 2 3jt j jt jt jt jtprice DetailingStock DTCStock           
(T5) 
 
The random component of the utility is ijt . Collecting the individual specific terms from equations (4) 
and (5) we get  
ijt
k
iktkjktijt eX 





    (T6) 
where Xjt is a vector of  Pricejt , jtDetailingStock  and jtDTCStock .  The distribution of  is assumed to 
be a multivariate normal  . Based on the mean utility jt  the probability of purchase of brand j at time t 
is: 
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  (T7) 
where   represents the set of parameters. This is the usual multinomial logit model but with the added jt  
term (Chintagunta, 2001). Aggregation up to market shares of each brand is done starting with the utility 
of a brand j at time t for individual i . The predicted market share for brand j is given by: 
( ) ( | , )jt jtS P f d       (T8) 
The random component terms are simulated from a standard normal distribution follwoign which 
the predicted shares arederived. Contraction mapping (BLP, 1995) implies computing a value of the 
unobserved attribute of brand j at time t, jt , that  makes the predicted brand shares close to the actual 
brand shares at time t. The parameters are estimated by interacting the jt  term with instruments and using 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  
T2.1 Instruments  
Product characteristics unobserved by the econometrician may be correlated with price, giving rise 
to the problem of endogeneity. Three sets of instruments are used to control for endogeneity between price 
and unobserved variables. The first set of instruments used are hospital prices (IMS health). These are 
likely to be good instruments, because evidence suggests that although firms set hospital prices differently 
from retail prices, the two are correlated (Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). The second set of instruments for 
price are lagged own prices for each brand. A similar approach has been followed in the extant literature 
(for example, Chintagunta, 2000) A third set of instruments used is the “BLP instruments”, i.e., relevant 
characteristics of other products/brands. In particular, the average prices for all other brands (excluding 
the focal brand’s prices) are used as instruments.  
Further, detailing and DTCA may also be correlated with unobserved product characteristics i.e., 
may be endogenous. Detailing and DTCA are instrumented using lagged detailing and lagged DTCA 
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respectively, as well as the relevant BLP instruments (i.e. the sum of detailing of other brands and sum of 
DTCA of other brands).  
T.2.2 Carryover Parameters 
Following past literature (Narayanan et. al., 2004, Wittink, 2002, Guadagni and Little, 1983) we use an 
aggregate logit model and a grid search method such that the parameters chosen had the highest R2 values.  
These carryover coefficients are consistent with previous studies; for example, Narayanan et al. (2004) 
find carryover parameters of 0.86 and 0.75 for detailing and DTCA respectively in the anti-allergy 
category, while Berndt et al. (1997) find advertising carryover to be 0.85 in the anti-ulcer drug market. 
The carryover parameter values used in the model are 0.85 and 0.72 for detailing and DTCA respectively.  
 
T3: Consumer Welfare  
 
Equations (4) and (5) above are the indirect utilities before and after the policy change. To reiterate  
these are represented in general by   
ijtjtijtU            (T4)  
where the random component of utility is  
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It is these utilities that are used to calculate the change in consume welfare as shown below.   
The compensating variation (CV) approach assumes that the marginal utility of income is 
constant across the two situations, i.e., utility is linear in income Assuming a constant marginal utility of 
income, the expected consumer surplus is given by (Train 2003; Small and Rosen, 1981): 
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where the utility of consumer i net of the extreme value distribution is Vij,  and the marginal utility of consumption 
is 
i , and C is an unknown indicating that absolute levels of utility cannot be measured (Train, 2003).   
The change in welfare (Small and Rosen, 1981) for consumer i between the two policy conditions, before 
and after the change in FDA policy (denoted by pre-DTCA and post-DTCA respectively) is given by: 
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Equation (T9) is derived assuming constant marginal utility of income; empirical evidence suggests that the 
estimates of changes in welfare are not substantially different when computed assuming constant marginal utility 
of income versus not (Herriges Kling, 1999).  
The focus is on the change in consumer welfare after DTCA is allowed versus before. In order to measure 
this change, both, (4) and (5) are estimated to give us two sets of demand side parameters. Let the price response 
parameter before and after DTCA be denoted by 
DTCA-Pre
1i
and
DTCA-Post
1i
 respectively. Equation (T11) is used to 
estimate the change in consumer welfare. In calculating the change in welfare we use the absolute value of the price 
parameter value, 1i , since it si a negative number (Train, 2003). 
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Equation (T11) is referred to as equation 7 in the body of the paper. 
 
 
